THE

CRISIS.

NUMBER LXXI. *To be continued Weekly,*

DURING THE PRESENT BLOODY CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

SATURDAY, May 25, 1776, [Price Two-pence Halfpenny

For, the CRISIS.

SIR,

By your leave I mean to ſhew how much it is the intereſt of the king and his miniſters to uſe the people well; by making theſe obſervations the ſubject of your next paper, you will particularly oblige

your's A. B.

IT is altogether impoſſible for one man or a ſmall number of men, to ſupport themſelves in power upon their own proper ſtrength, without taking in the aſſiſtance of a great many others, and they can never have that aſſiſtance, unleſs they take in their intereſt too; for men will laugh at bare arguments brought to prove, that they muſt labour, be robbed of that labour, and want; that others may live in idleneſs, riot, and plunder. Thoſe governments therefore which are founded upon oppreſſion, always find it neceſſary to engage intereſts enough in their tyranny to overcome all oppoſition from thoſe who are tyrannized over, by giving *ſeperate* and *unequal* privileges to the inſtruments and accomplices of their oppreſſion and cruelty.

But,

But, when a government is founded upon liberty and equal laws, it is redioulous for thoſe in the adminiſtration to have any hopes of preſerving themſelves long there, but by juſt actions, or the appearance of juſt actions; and by letting the people find, or fancy they find, their own happineſs in their ſubmiſſion. It is certain that the people have ſo juſt a dread of public diſturbances, that they will bear a great deal before they will involve themſelves in tumults and wars; and mankind are ſo prone to emulation and ambition, and to purſue their ſeperate intereſts, that it is eaſy to form them into parties, and play thoſe parties in their turns upon one another; but all parties will at laſt compare notes, and find out that they are only made uſe of as cudgels in the hands of wicked men, to aſſault each other by turns, till they are both undone. It is downright madneſs, to hope long to govern ALL againſt the intereſt of ALL.

People will for ſome time be dallied with, and amuſed with falſe reaſonings, miſrepreſentations, and promiſes, wild expectations, vain terrors and imaginary fears; but all theſe hopes and apprehenſions will vaniſh by degrees, will produce a quite contrary effect, and no wiſe man will think it prudent to provoke a whole people. What could king James do againſt his whole people? His miniſters betrayed him, his family deſerted him, his ſoldiers revolted from him, and it was fooliſh to expect any thing elſe; for how could he hope, that thoſe who could have no motive to ſtand by him, beſides their own perſonal intereſt, and every motive to oppoſe him ariſing from conſcience and honour, would not leave him when that intereſt changed, and when they could ſerve themſelves better by ſerving their country.

I laugh at the ſtupid notions of thoſe who think that more is due from them to their patrons, who are truſted to diſpoſe of employments for the public benefit, than to their country, for whoſe ſake, and by whoſe direction, thoſe employments were firſt inſtituted, out of whoſe pocket the profits of them ariſe, and from whoſe confidence or credulity their pretended benefactors derive all their power to give them. Thoſe who receive them, accept the gift upon the terms of the conſtitution, that is to execute them faithfully for the public good, and not to take the people's money to deſtroy the people.

What

What did the whole power of ſpain do againſt a few revolted provinces, when all the people were enraged by oppreſſion? how many armies were loſt, how many millions fooliſhly ſquandered, to recover by force what a few juſt conſeſſions would have done at once? Her generals no ſooner took one town, but two revolted; and they ſometimes loſt ten without ſtriking a ſtroke, for one that they gained by the ſword: What by the mutinies of her own ſoldiers, and other common events, which uſually happen in ſuch caſes, they twice loſt altogether, and were forced to begin ther game anew; and ſo deſtroyed a mighty empire, to oppreſs a little part of it, whoſe affections might have been regained by doing them but common juſtice.

It is ſenſleſs to hope to overcome ſome ſorts of convulſive diſtempers, by holding the patient's hands, and tying him with ropes, which will only encreaſe the malady; whereas the ſofteſt remedies ought to be uſed: Violent methods may ſtop the diſtemper for a little time, but the cauſe of the grief remains behind, and will break out again more furiouſly. What did king James get by all his bloody executions in the Weſt, by his manacling us with chains, and keeping up a military force, to lock them on, but to frighten his friends, ſtill more to provoke his enemies, and at laſt to unite them all againſt himſelf? And yet, I believe, I may venture to aſſert, that if, inſtead of throwing the broad ſeal into the Thames, and deſerting his people, he had ſuffered his parliament to ſit, and given up ſome of the inſtruments of his tyranny, and had permitted them to have taken a few proper precautions to have hindred it for the future, he need not have been a fugitive through the world.

It is certain, that if king Charles had made at firſt, and with a good grace, but half of thoſe conceſſions which were extorted from him afterwards, that bloody war, ſo fatal to himſelf and family, had been prevented, and the ambition or malice of his perſonal enemies had been ſuppreſſed, or turned to their own confuſion, and he himſelf might have reigned a happy prince, with as much power as he had a right to by the conſtitution: Whereas, if my Lord *Clarendon* be to be believed, the whole kingdom (very few excepted) took part againſt the court at firſt, and continued to do ſo 'till ſome leading men in the Houſe of Commons diſcovered intentions to overturn the monarchy itſelf.

If

It is fooliſh therefore to be frightened with apprehenſions which may be removed at pleaſure: the way to cure people of their fears, is, not to frighten them further, but to remove the cauſes of their fears. If the kingdom be diſaffected, (as its enemies of all ſorts would make us believe) let enquiry be made into the motives of that diſaffection. It cannot be *perſonally* to his Majeſty, who is a *moſt excellent* Prince; and his greateſt opponents neither do nor can object to him thoſe vices, which too often accompany and are allied to crowns: nor is there the leaſt pretence to accuſe him of any *Deſigns* of enlarging his *Prerogative* beyond its due bounds. It is certain, that when he came to the crown, he had a large ſhare in the affections of his people, *and he himſelf has done nothing to make it leſs.*

It cannot be to his title, which is the beſt upon earth, even the poſitive conſent of a great and free nation.

Whence therefore ſhould ſuch diſaffection ariſe, if there be any ſuch as I hope there is not? and it plainly appears that there is not, or that it is not general, by the dutiful *reception* which his majeſty meets with in *all places*. And the ſame loyal diſpoſition would appear more and more every day, if thoſe who have the honour to be admitted to his more immediate confidence would repreſent honeſtly to him what he ought to know.

It is childiſh to ſay, that a few flies and inſects can riſe a great duſt; or, that a ſmall number of diſappointed and unpreferred men can ſhake a great kingdom, with a wiſe prince at the head of it, ſupported with ſuch power and dependances. A great fire cannot be raiſed without feuel, and the materials which make it muſt have been combuſtible, before. And if this be our caſe we ought to aſk how came they ſo? and who made them inflamable? Who laid the Gunpowder? as well as who fired or intended to fire it? When we have done this, we ought to remove the cauſes of the diſtemper, allay the heat of the fever by gentle lenatives, throw no more fiery ſpirits to inflame the conſtitution, but do all that we can to ſoften and cool it.

Every Country in the world will have many malecontents; ſome through want and neceſſity; others through ambition and reſtleſneſs of

of temper; many from diſappointments and perſonal reſentment; more from the fear of juſt puniſhment for crimes: but all theſe together can never be dangerous to any ſtate, which knows how to ſeperate the peoples reſentment from theirs. Make the former eaſy, and the others are diſarmed at once. When the cauſes of general diſcontent are removed, particular diſcontents will ſignify nothing.

The firſt care which wiſe governors will always take is, to prevent their ſubjects from wanting, and to ſecure to them the poſſeſſion of their property, upon which every thing elſe depends. They will raiſe no taxes but what the people ſhall ſee a neceſſity for raiſing; and no longer than that neceſſity continues: and ſuch taxes ought to be levied cautiouſly, and laid out frugally. No project ought to be formed to enrich *a few*, and to ruin thouſands: for when men of forſortune come to loſe their fortunes, they will try by all means to get new ones; and when they cannot do it fairly, they will do it as they are able; and if they cannot do it at all, will throw all things into confuſion, to make others as miſerable as themſelves. If people are poor, they will be deſperate and catce at every occaſion, and join with every faction, to make public diſturbances, and to make their own condition better, when they find it cannot be worſe.

Wiſe ſtateſmen will ſee all this at a diſtance; will uſe the beſt precautions, and moſt prudent meaſures, to procure general plenty, encreaſe trade and manufactures, and keep the people uſefully employed at home, inſtead of ſtarving, and prating ſedition in the ſtreets. They will not be perpetually provoking them with conſtant injuries, giving them eternal occaſions and reaſons for diſſatisfaction, and then quarrel with them for ſhewing it, and be ſtill encreaſing their diſcontents, by prepoſterouſly endeavouring to put a ſtop to them by new ſhackles armed bands, bribery and corruption, and by laying on them freſh burdens and impoſitions to maintain ſuch oppreſſions; and ſo when they have raiſed reſentment to the higheſt pitch vainly hope to ſtop the tide. This is what the king of Spain did formerly in the Dutch provinces, and king James the Second in England, but what, I hope, will never be ſeen here again.

But it will be ſaid, that people will be ſometimes diſſatsfied without any juſt provocations given to them by their governors; the neceſſi-

ties

ties of all ſtates will ſometimes ſubject themſelves to greater taxes and other ſeeming oppreſſions, than they can well bear.

When this happens to be the caſe, there ought to be double diligence uſed to prevent the ill conſequences from ſuch diſaffection: no more money ought to be raiſed than is ſtrictly neceſſary, for the peoples protection; and they are to be ſhewn that neceſſity, and are to ſee from time to time, the accounts of what they give, that it is diſburſed frugally and honeſtly, and not engroſſed by private men, laviſhed upon minions, or ſquandered away in uſeleſs penſions to undeſervers, and that the product of the whole peoples labour and ſubſtance is not ſuffered to be devoured by a few of the worſt of men.

What can be more invidious, than for a nation ſtaggering under the weight and oppreſſion of its debts, eaten up with uſury, and exhauſted to have the additional mortification to ſee private and worthleſs men riot in their calamities, and grow rich whilſt they grow poor; to ſee the town every day glittering with new and pompous equipages, whilſt they are mortgaging and ſelling their eſtates, without having ſpent them; to ſee blazing meteors ſuddenly exhalted out of their jakes, and their mud, as in Egypt, warmed in monſters.

Printed and Publiſhed for the AUTHORS by T. W. SHAW, Fleet-Street, oppoſite Anderton's Coffee-Houſe, where Letters to the Publiſher will be thankfully received. New Editions of all the Numbers of this ſpirited Paper, are now ready for Sale, and *compleat ſets* will be ſent to any Part of *England, Carriage Free.*